J.R.I. WEB MASTER IS WINNING HIS TRAFFIC CASE! IT WORKS IF YOU WORK IT!

From: "JUDICIAL REFORM INVESTIGATIONS"
J.R.I. WEB MASTER IS WINNING HIS TRAFFIC CASE! IT WORKS IF YOU WORK IT!

Folks,

We have been working with our web master on an Traffic Case and Billy is
winning!
The City Attorney is refusing to show on the next date and the case will be
dismissed!
Reporters are making contact as you are reading this.......................

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-------Original Message-------

From: Tina Kendrick
Date: Tuesday, August 05, 2003 12:22:51
To: Billy wiseman
Subject: Re:

Mr. Wiseman

Would you like this publish in the Daily Court Review?

Please call me at 713 293-1331.

Thank you,

Tina L. Kendrick
Inside Sales & Customer Service Manager
Daily Court Review
713 293-1331
tina@dailycourtreview.com

----- Original Message -----
From: Billy wiseman
To: tina@dailycourtreview.com
Sent: Tuesday, August 05, 2003 1:58 AM

In the Circuit Court of the state of Oregon
CITY OF KLAMATH FALLS

CITY OF KLAMATH FALLS
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Defendant-Appellant
WILLIAM JON WISEMAN
PRO-SE
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circuit Court No. 0305676TR
citation # 64666
APPEAL
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE FOR DISMISSAL
FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
JURY TRIAL REQUESTED

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE
FOR DISMISSAL FOR LACK OFJURISDICTION

Appellant William Jon wiseman
sovereign Native American Cherokee Indian Knows First Hand That Receiving a
Drivers License From Any State does not give The License Driver The Knowledge
to Drive But The Privilege to operate a motor vehicle. On January 30,2001 The
ABOVE Appellant was Struck and Thrown 10 Feet And Put On Advance Life
Support By A License HIT & RUN DRIVER Named Walter Broadwell IV Making The
Appellant Fight For His Life (See Appellant EXIBIT C) In Which Appellant Had A
Stroke and Causing Brain Damage In Which Appellant's speech is slurred Making
The Police Think Appellant Is Drunk or On Drugs But Appellant is 100% Sober and
Drug FREE and even Refuses To Take Drugs For The Pain That he is still in. The
Appellant was attempting to get an Oregon Drivers License (See Appellant EXIBIT
B) however due to the defendant Not Felling Well Has not Done so The Only Time
The Appellant Drives is When He Goes To The Store Or Goes To Church On Saturday
Nights However Has not Been Going To Church as of Late..
Appellant Was Coming Back From The Store and at
The Time Had The Owner a VIETNAM War Vet in The Car with The Appellant and was
Stopping To Get Gas Before Going Home, The Appellant Has Been Driving Said 1984
Camaro (See Appellant EXIBIT C) sense June 2002 with no Tickets No Motor Vehicle
Collision"s Or In Anyway Harmed Anyone On The Road. The Officer Made The
Appellant and Owner Walk Home And Towed The Owners Car. Because The appellant
Did Not Have A Drivers License and was Not Wearing a Seat Belt. And wrote
Appellant a ticket and told to show up for court on july 31,2003. (See Appellant
EXIBIT D )
On June 10 2003 Appellant Filed a Motion Common
Law Vehicular Judicial Notice Constitional Drivers License (See Appellant EXIBIT
E ) and The Municipal court Treated The Motion as a Letter and on july 18 2003
Judge Barbra DITACONI Denied The Motion and (See Appellant EXIBIT A ) Found
The Appellant guilty as Charged and fined the Appellant $290 dollars without
the right of trial by jury .
Article VIII, Section 3, of the Oregon
Constitution (amended), provides that "[i]n actions at law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed $200, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.
The Appellant Filed Two More Motions On July
21,2003 One of Them asking That judge James uerlings step down From This case
due to a conflict of interest in that said judge was on the board of directors
at Basin Transit Service (See Appellant EXIBIT F ) and The Appellant felt he
would not get a fair Trial Due to it being a Driving Case and Mr. uerlings job
was to Look Out For The Bus/ Transit interest However it was Denied again as The
Appellant had The Wrong Judge But The Right Firm.
Judge Barbra DIIACONI Did not Recuse Herself
From This Case as she should have because judge James uerlings and Judge Barbra
DIIACONI Own The Same Firm called: Boivin, Uerlings & DiIaconi, P.C.
The Appellant Attempted To Get a Drivers License
From The DMV But Was Told He Could not have one because The Appellant Drivers
License Was Revoked In Another State But That was 17 Years ago (See Appellant
EXIBIT G) and should Be Held BY THIS COURT as UNConstitional. Appellant Is Not
Asking This Court For The Privilege To Drive But HIS Constitional Right To
Drive.
On July 1 ,2003 A new Vermont law, which
went into effect stipulates that driving with a suspended license is only a
civil offense, which can't be prosecuted in criminal court. (See Appellant
EXIBIT H & I)
Equal protection requires that those individuals
similarly situated are treated alike. City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center,
473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
.
Federal Law and Supreme Court Cases apply to
State Court Cases
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990)
The right to travel has long been considered a
fundamental constitutional right. Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez et
al., 476 U.S. 898 (1986). Oregon extends this right to include intrastate travel
in addition in interstate travel. Josephine County School District No & v.
Oregon School Activities Association, 15 Or. App. 185, 515 P.2d 431 (1973).
The OREGON CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, States
Judicial Rule 1: Maintaining the Integrity of
the Judicial System JR 1-101 (D) A judge shall not engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. (E) A judge shall not allow
family, social or other relationship to influence judicial conduct or judgment.
F) A judge shall not use the position to advance the private interests of the
judge or any person, nor shall a judge convey or permit anyone to convey the
impression that anyone has a special influence with the judge, but a judge may
provide a character or ability reference for a person about whom the judge has
personal knowledge. (H) A judge shall not hold membership in any organization
that the judge knows is a discriminatory organization. For purposes of this
rule, "discriminatory organization" means an organization that, as a policy or
practice and contrary to applicable federal or state law, treats persons less
favorably in granting membership privileges, allowing participation or providing
services on the basis of sex, race, national origin, religion, sexual
orientation, marital status, disability or age.
Judicial Rule 2: Impartial and Diligent
Performance of Judicial JR 2-102
(A) A judge shall provide to every person who
has a legal interest in a proceeding, and to that person's lawyer, the right to
be heard according to law.
JR 2-106
(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself
in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality reasonably may be questioned,
including but not limited to instances when
(1) the judge has a bias or prejudice concerning
a party or has personal knowledge or disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;
(2) the judge served as a lawyer in the matter
in controversy, or a lawyer with whom
the judge previously was associated served
during the association as a lawyer in the matter, or the judge or the lawyer has
been a material witness in the matter;
(3) the judge knows that the judge, individually
or as a fiduciary, or
the judge's spouse, parent or child, wherever
residing, or any other person residing in the judge's household has a financial
interest in the subject matter in controversy, is a party to the proceeding or
has any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of
the proceeding;
(4) the judge, the judge's spouse, parent or
child wherever residing, or any other person residing in the judge's household:
(a) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer,
director, partner or trustee of a party;
(b) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(c) is known by the judge to have an interest
that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; or
(d) is, to the judge's knowledge, likely to be a
material witness in the proceeding.
(B) A judge shall be responsible for knowing
about the judge's financial interests, including such interests relating to
service as a fiduciary, and shall make reasonable efforts to be informed about
the financial interests of the judge's spouse, domestic partner, parents and
children, wherever residing.
(C) For purposes of this rule:
(1) "fiduciary" includes relationships such as
personal representative, trustee, conservator and guardian;
(2) "financial interest" means ownership of a
legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director,
advisor or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that:
(a) ownership in a mutual or common investment
fund that owns securities is not a "financial interest" unless the judge
participates in the management of the fund;
(b) holding an office in an educational,
religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization is not a "financial
interest" in property of the organization;
(c) the proprietary interest of a policyholder
in a mutual insurance company, a depositor in mutual savings association, or a
similar proprietary interest, is a "financial interest" in the organization only
if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the
interest; and
(d) ownership of government securities is a
"financial interest" in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could
substantially affect the value of the securities.
(D) A judge who is disqualified under this rule
may, rather than withdraw from the proceeding, disclose on the record the basis
of the disqualification. If, after such disclosure, the parties all agree in
writing or on the record that the judge's relationship is immaterial or that the
judge's financial interest is insubstantial, the judge may participate in the
proceeding. Any writing, signed by or on behalf of all parties, shall be
incorporated in the record of the proceeding.
JR 2-110
(A) A judge shall be patient, dignified and
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court personnel and members
of the public.
(B) A judge shall not act in a way that the
judge knows, or reasonably should know, would
be perceived by a reasonable person as biased or
prejudiced toward any of the litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers or members of
the public.
(C) A judge shall require lawyers and court
personnel who are subject to the judge's direction or control to act in accord
with the principles embodied in paragraphs (A) and (B) of this rule.
(D) Paragraphs (B) and (C) of this rule do not
preclude consideration or advocacy of any issue relevant to the proceeding.
Judicial Rule 3: Extra-Judicial Activities;
Minimizing the Risk of Conflict with Judicial Obligations
JR 3-101
A judge shall not serve as an officer, director,
trustee or advisor of a private or public corporation or of an educational,
religious, charitable, fraternal, political or civic organization if the
corporation or organization regularly engages in proceedings that would
ordinarily come before the judge or in adversary proceedings in any court in
Oregon.
JR 3-107
A judge shall not engage in the private practice
of law, except as otherwise provided in JR 5-102.

Therefore Judge Barbra DITACONI has violated The Appellant's Due process
Rights The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides that, "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."Due process in administrative hearings includes a
fair trial conducted in accordance with fundamental principles of fair play and
applicable procedural standards established by law, and administrative
convenience or necessity cannot override this requirement." [Russell-Newman Mfg.
Co. v. N.L.R.B., C.A. Tex 1966, 370 F2d 980]
"Due process requires that when government
adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly affect legal rights of
individuals, they use procedures which have traditionally been associated with
judicial process." [Amos Treat & Co. v. Securities & Echange Commission, 306 F2d
260 (1962), 113 US App. D.C. 100]
"Administrative due process requires:
(1) opportunity to be heard.
(2) due notice of hearing
(3) fair conduct of hearing
(4) support in record for decision
(5) submission of proposed findings and
tentative report
(6) opportunity to file and to be heard upon
exceptions to the report
[Ideal Farm, Inc. v. Benson, D.C. N.J. 1960, 181
F Supp 62, affirmed 288 F2d 608, Certiorari denied 83 Sct 1087, 327 US 965, 10
Led2d 128]
"The requirement of fair trial is binding on
administrative agencies as well as on the courts" [U.S. v. Brad, D.C. Cal 1968]
"The fair hearing essential to meet minimal
requirements of due process includes not only rudimentary fairness in conduct of
hearing when and where held, but also reasonable fair opportunity to be present
at time and place fixed to cross-examine any opposing witnesses, to offer
evidence, and to be heard at least briefly in defense." [Jeffries v. Olsen, D.C.
Cal 1954, 121 Fsupp 163]
"A full hearing is one in which ample
opportunity is afforded to all parties to make, by evidence and argument, a
showing fairly adequate to establish the propriety or impropriety, from the
standpoint of justice and law, of the step to be taken." [Boston and M.R.R. v.
U.S., D.C. Mass. 1962, 208 Fsupp 661]
NO STATE may convert a RIGHT into a PRIVILEGE
and require a LICENSE or FEE for the exercise of that RIGHT!!! Please see
MURDOCK vs. PENNSYLVANIA, 319 U.S. 105, and if a STATE does erroneously do
require A LICENSE OR FEE for exercise of the RIGHT, the Citizen may IGNORE THE
LICENSE AND OR FEE and exercise the RIGHT WITH TOTAL IMPUNITY!!! Please see
SCHUTTLESWORTH vs. BIRMINGHAM 373 U.S. 262. YOU CAN NOT BE PUNISHED FOR THE
EXERCISE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT!!! Please see MILLER vs. UNITED STATES 230
F2nd 486.

If ever a judge understood the public's right to use the public roads,it was
Justice Tolman of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.Justice Tolman
stated: "Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established
ablessing that we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and tollroads,
and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, thehighways may be
completely monopolized, if, through lack of interest,the people submit, then
they may look to see the most sacred of theirliberties taken from them one by
one, by more or less rapidencroachment." Robertson vs. Department of Public
Works, 180 Wash 133,147. The words of Justice Tolman ring most prophetically in
the ears ofCitizens throughout the country today as the use of the public roads
hasbeen monopolized by the very entity which has been empowered to standguard
over our freedoms, i.e., that of state government. RIGHTS The "most sacred of
liberties" of which Justice Tolman spoke waspersonal liberty. The definition of
personal liberty is: "Personal liberty, or the Right to enjoyment of life
and liberty,is one of the fundamental or natural Rights, which has been
protected byits inclusion as a guarantee in the various constitutions, which is
notderived from, or dependent on, the U.S. Constitution, which may not
besubmitted to a vote and may not depend on the outcome of an election. Itis one
of the most sacred and valuable Rights, as sacred as the Right toprivate
property...and is regarded as inalienable." 16 C.J.S.,Constitutional Law,
Sect.202, p.987. This concept is further amplified by the definition of personal
liberty: "Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion --
togo where and when one pleases -- only so far restrained as the Rights ofothers
may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. TheRight of the
Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transporthis property thereon,
by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, isnot a mere privilege which may
be permitted or prohibited at will, butthe common Right which he has under his
Right to life, liberty, and thepursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional
guarantee one may,therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination
along thepublic highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in
anorderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbinganother's
Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but inhis safe conduct."
[emphasis added] II Am.Jur. (1st) Constitutional Law,Sect.329, p.1135. ....and
further... "Personal liberty -- consists ofthe power of locomotion, of changing
situations, of removing one'sperson to whatever place one's inclination may
direct, withoutimprisonment or restraint unless by due process of law." 1
Blackstone'sCommentary 134; Hare, Constitution__.777; Bovier's Law Dictionary,
1914ed., Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. Justice Tolman was concerned about the
State prohibiting the Citizenfrom the "most sacred of his liberties," the Right
of movement, theRight of moving one's self from place to place without threat
ofimprisonment, the Right to use the public roads in the ordinary courseof life.
When the State allows the formation of a corporation it may control itscreation
by establishing guidelines (statutes) for its operation(charters). Corporations
who use the roads in the course of business donot use the roads in the ordinary
course of life. There is a differencebetween a corporation and an individual.
The United States Supreme Courthas stated: "...We are of the opinion that
there is a clear distinction in thisparticular between an individual and a
corporation, and that the latterhas no right to refuse to submit its books and
papers for examination onthe suit of the State. The individual may stand upon
his ConstitutionalRights as a Citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private
business inhis own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to
theState or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doorsto
investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes nosuch duty to
the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond theprotection of his
life, liberty, and property. His Rights are such asthe law of the land long
antecedent to the organization of the state,and can only be taken from him by
due process of law, and in accordancewith the Constitution. Among his Rights
are the refusal to incriminatehimself, and the immunity of himself and his
property from arrest orseizure except under warrant of law. He owes nothing to
the public solong as he does not trespass upon their rights. "Upon the
other hand, the corporation is a creature of the state.It is presumed to be
incorporated for the benefit of the public. Itreceives certain special
privileges and franchises, and holds themsubject to the laws of the state and
the limitations of its charter.Its rights to act as a corporation are only
preserved to it so long asit obeys the laws of its creation. There is a
reserved right in thelegislature to investigate its contracts and find out
whether it hasexceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that
theState, having chartered a corporation to make use of certainfranchises, could
not in exercise of its sovereignty inquire how thosefranchises had been
employed, and whether they had been abused, anddemand the production of
corporate books and papers for that purpose."[emphasis added] Hale vs. Hinkel,
201 US 43, 74-75. Corporations engaged in mercantile equity fall under the
purview of theState's admiralty jurisdiction, and the public at large must
beprotected from their activities, as they (the corporations) are engagedin
business for profit. "...Based upon the fundamental ground that the sovereign
state has theplenary control of the streets and highways in the exercise of
itspolice power (see police power, infra.), may absolutely prohibit the useof
the streets as a place for the prosecution of a private business forgain. They
all recognize the fundamental distinction between theordinary Right of the
Citizen to use the streets in the usual way andthe use of the streets as a place
of business or a main instrumentalityof business for private gain. The former
is a common Right, the latteris an extraordinary use. As to the former the
legislative power isconfined to regulation, as to the latter it is plenary and
extends evento absolute prohibition. Since the use of the streets by a
commoncarrier in the prosecution of its business as such is not a right but
amere license of privilege." Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 657l, 168,p.516. It
will be necessary to review early cases and legal authority in orderto reach a
lawfully correct theory dealing with this Right or"privilege." We will attempt
to reach a sound conclusion as to what is a"Right to use the road" and what is a
"privilege to use the road". Oncereaching this determination, we shall then
apply those positions tomodern case decision. "Where rights secured by the
Constitution are involved, there canbe no rule making or legislation which would
abrogate them." Mirandavs. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491. ...and... "The claim and
exercise of aconstitutional Right cannot be converted into a crime." Miller vs.
U.S.,230 F. 486, 489. ...and... "There can be no sanction or penalty imposedupon
one because of this exercise of constitutional Rights." Snerer vs.Cullen, 481 F.
946. Streets and highways are established and maintained for the purpose
oftravel and transportation by the public. Such travel may be for businessor
pleasure. "The use of the highways for the purpose of travel
andtransportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamentalRight of
which the public and the individual cannot be rightfullydeprived." [emphasis
added] Chicago Motor Coach vs. Chicago, 169 NE 22;Ligare vs. Chicago, 28 NE
934; Boon vs. Clark, 214 SSW 607; 25 Am.Jur.(1st) Highways Sect.163.
...and..."The Right of the Citizen to travelupon the public highways and to
transport his property thereon, eitherby horse drawn carriage or by automobile,
is not a mere privilege whicha city can prohibit or permit at will, but a common
Right which he hasunder the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness."[emphasis added] Thompson vs. Smith, 154 SE 579. So we can see that
a Citizen has a Right to travel upon the publichighways by automobile and the
Citizen cannot be rightfully deprived ofhis Liberty. So where does the
misconception that the use of the publicroad is always and only a privilege come
from? "...For while a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the
publichighways and to transport his property thereon, that Right does notextend
to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as aplace for private
gain. For the latter purpose no person has a vestedright to use the highways of
the state, but is a privilege or a licensewhich the legislature may grant or
withhold at its discretion." Statevs. Johnson, 243 P. 1073; Hadfield, supra;
Cummins vs. Homes, 155 P.171; Packard vs. Banton, 44 S.Ct. 256; and other cases
too numerous tomention. Here the court held that a Citizen has the Right to
travel upon thepublic highways, but that he did not have the right to conduct
businessupon the highways. On this point of law all authorities are unanimous.
"Heretofore the court has held, and we think correctly, that whilea Citizen has
the Right to travel upon the public highways and totransport his property
thereon, that Right does not extend to the use ofthe highways, either in whole
or in part, as a place of business forprivate gain." Barney vs. Board of
Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82;Willis vs. Buck, 263 P.l 982. and... "The
right of the citizen totravel upon the highway and to transport his property
thereon, in theordinary course of life and business, differs radically and
obviouslyfrom that of one who makes the highway his place of business forprivate
gain in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus." State vs. Cityof Spokane, 186
P. 864. What is this Right of the Citizen which differs so "radically
andobviously" from one who uses the highway as a place of business? Whobetter to
enlighten us than Justice Tolman of the Supreme Court ofWashington State? In
State vs. City of Spokane, supra, the Court alsonoted a very "radical and
obvious" difference, but went on to explainjust what the difference is:
"The former is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen, acommon right to
all, while the latter is special, unusual, andextraordinary." and... "This
distinction, elementary and fundamentalin character, is recognized by all the
authorities." State vs. City ofSpokane, supra. This position does not hang
precariously upon only a few cases, but hasbeen proclaimed by an impressive
array of cases ranging from the statecourts to the federal courts. "the
right of the Citizen to travel upon the highway and totransport his property
thereon in the ordinary course of life andbusiness, differs radically and
obviously from that of one who makes thehighway his place of business and uses
it for private gain in therunning of a stagecoach or omnibus. The former is the
usual and ordinaryright of the Citizen, a right common to all, while the latter
isspecial, unusual, and extraordinary." Ex Parte Dickey, (Dickey vs.Davis), 85
SE 781. ...and... "The right of the Citizen to travel uponthe public highways
and to transport his property thereon, in theordinary course of life and
business, is a common right which he hasunder the right to enjoy life and
liberty, to acquire and possessproperty, and to pursue happiness and safety. It
includes the right, inso doing, to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of
the day, andunder the existing modes of travel, includes the right to drive a
horsedrawn carriage or wagon thereon or to operate an automobile thereon,for
the usual and ordinary purpose of life and business." Teche Linesvs. Danforth,
Miss., 12 S.2d 784; Thompson vs. Smith, supra. There is no dissent among various
authorities as to this position. (SeeAm.Jur. [1st] Const. Law, 329 and
corresponding Am. Jur. [2nd].) "Personal liberty -- or the right to
enjoyment of life and liberty-- is one of the fundamental or natural rights,
which has beenprotected by its inclusion as a guarantee in the various
constitutions,which is not derived from nor dependent on the U.S.
Constitution... Itis one of the most sacred and valuable rights [remember the
words ofJustice Tolman, supra.] as sacred as the right to privateproperty...and
is regarded as inalienable." 16 C.J.S. Const. Law,Sect.202, p.987. As we can
see, the distinction between a "Right" to use the public roadsand a "privilege"
to use the public roads is drawn upon the line of"using the road as a place of
business" and the various state courtshave held so. But what have the U.S.
courts held on this point? "First, it is well established law that the
highways of the stateare public property, and their primary and preferred use is
for privatepurposes, and that their use for purposes of gain is special
andextraordinary which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibitor
condition as it sees fit." Stephenson vs. Rinford, 287 US 251;Pachard vs Banton,
264 US 140, and cases cited; Frost and F. TruckingCo. vs. Railroad Commission,
271 US 592; Railroad commission vs.Inter-City Forwarding Co., 57 SW.2d 290;
Parlett Cooperative vs.Tidewater Lines, 164 A. 313. So what is a privilege to
use the roads? By now it should be apparenteven to the "learned" that an attempt
to use the road as a place ofbusiness is a privilege. The distinction must be
drawn between... 1.Travelling upon and transporting one's property upon the
publicroads, which is our Right; and... 2.Using the public roads as a place of
business or a maininstrumentality of business, which is a privilege. "[The
roads]...are constructed and maintained at public expense,and no person
therefore, can insist that he has, or may acquire, avested right to their use
in carrying on a commercial business." ExParte Sterling, 53 SW.2d 294; Barney
vs. Railroad Commissioners, 17P.2d 82; Stephenson vs. Binford, supra. "When
the public highways are made the place of business the statehas a right to
regulate their use in the interest of safety andconvenience of the public as
well as the preservation of the highways."Barney vs. Railroad Commissioners,
supra. "[The state's] right to regulate such use is based upon the natureof
the business and the use of the highways in connection therewith."Ibid.
"We know of no inherent right in one to use the highways forcommercial purposes.
The highways are primarily for the use of thepublic, and in the interest of the
public, the state may prohibit orregulate...the use of the highways for gain."
Robertson vs. Dept. ofPublic Works, supra. There should be considerable
authority on a subject as important a thisdeprivation of the liberty of the
individual "using the roads in theordinary course of life and business."
However, it should be noted thatextensive research has not turned up one case or
authority acknowledgingthe state's power to convert the individual's right to
travel upon thepublic roads into a "privilege." Therefore, it is concluded that
the Citizen does have a "Right" totravel and transport his property upon the
public highways and roads andthe exercise of this Right is not a "privilege."
DEFINITIONS In order to understand the correct application of the statute
inquestion, we must first define the terms used in connection with thispoint of
law. As will be shown, many terms used today do not, in theirlegal context, mean
what we assume they mean, thus resulting in themisapplication of statutes in the
instant case. AUTOMOBILE AND MOTOR VEHICLE There is a clear distinction between
an automobile and a motor vehicle.An automobile has been defined as: "The
word `automobile' connotes a pleasure vehicle designed for thetransportation of
persons on highways." American Mutual Liability Ins.Co., vs. Chaput, 60 A.2d
118, 120; 95 NH 200. While the distinction is made clear between the two as the
courts havestated: "A motor vehicle or automobile for hire is a motor
vehicle, otherthan an automobile stage, used for the transportation of persons
forwhich remuneration is received." International Motor Transit Co. vs.Seattle,
251 P. 120. "The term `motor vehicle' is different and broader than the
word`automobile.'" City of Dayton vs. DeBrosse, 23 NE.2d 647, 650; 62 OhioApp.
232. The distinction is made very clear in Title 18 USC 31: "Motor vehicle"
means every description or other contrivancepropelled or drawn by mechanical
power and used for commercial purposeson the highways in the transportation of
passengers, or passengers andproperty. "Used for commercial purposes" means
the carriage of persons orproperty for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other
considerations, ordirectly or indirectly in connection with any business, or
otherundertaking intended for profit. Clearly, an automobile is private property
in use for private purposes,while a motor vehicle is a machine which may be used
upon the highwaysfor trade, commerce, or hire. TRAVEL The term "travel" is a
significant term and is defined as: "The term `travel' and `traveler' are
usually construed in theirbroad and general sense...so as to include all those
who rightfully usethe highways viatically (when being reimbursed for expenses)
and whohave occasion to pass over them for the purpose of business,convenience,
or pleasure." [emphasis added] 25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways,Sect.427, p.717.
"Traveler -- One who passes from place to place, whether forpleasure,
instruction, business, or health." Locket vs. State, 47 Ala.45; Bovier's Law
Dictionary, 1914 ed., p. 3309. "Travel -- To journey or to pass through or
over; as a countrydistrict, road, etc. To go from one place to another, whether
on foot,or horseback, or in any conveyance as a train, an automobile,
carriage,ship, or aircraft; Make a journey." Century Dictionary, p.2034.
Therefore, the term "travel" or "traveler" refers to one who uses aconveyance to
go from one place to another, and included all those whouse the highways as a
matter of Right. Notice that in all these definitions the phrase "for hire"
never occurs.This term "travel" or "traveler" implies, by definition, one who
usesthe road as a means to move from one place to another. Therefore, one who
uses the road in the ordinary course of life andbusiness for the purpose of
travel and transportation is a traveler. DRIVE Florida § Chapter 322.01
Definitions(15) "Drive" means to operate orbe in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle in any place open tothe general public for purposes of vehicular
traffic. (See "traffic" infra) DRIVER The term "driver" in contradistinction to
"traveler,": is defined as: "Driver -- One employed in conducting a coach,
carriage, wagon, orother vehicle..." Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., p. 940.
Notice that this definition includes one who is "employed" in conductinga
vehicle. It should be self-evident that this person could not be"travelling" on
a journey, but is using the road as a place of business. OPERATOR Today we
assume that a "traveler" is a "driver," and a "driver" is an"operator." However,
this is not the case. "It will be observed from the language of the
ordinance that adistinction is to be drawn between the terms `operator' and
`driver';the `operator' of the service car being the person who is licensed
tohave the car on the streets in the business of carrying passengers forhire;
while the `driver' is the one who actually drives the car.However, in the actual
prosecution of business, it was possible for thesame person to be both
`operator' and `driver.'" Newbill vs. UnionIndemnity Co., 60 SE.2d 658. To
further clarify the definition of an "operator" the court observedthat this was
a vehicle "for hire" and that it was in the business ofcarrying passengers. This
definition would seem to describe a person who is using the road asa place of
business, or in other words, a person engaged in the"privilege" of using the
road for gain. This definition, then, is a further clarification of the
distinctionmentioned earlier, and therefore: 1.Traveling upon and
transporting one's property upon the publicroads as a matter of Right meets the
definition of a traveler. 2.Using the road as a place of business as a matter
of privilegemeets the definition of a driver or an operator or both. TRAFFIC
Having defined the terms "automobile," "motor vehicle," "traveler,""driver," and
"operator," the next term to define is "traffic": "...Traffic thereon is to
some extent destructive, therefore, theprevention of unnecessary duplication of
auto transportation servicewill lengthen the life of the highways or reduce the
cost ofmaintenance, the revenue derived by the state...will also tend towardthe
public welfare by producing at the expense of those operating forprivate gain,
some small part of the cost of repairing the wear..."Northern Pacific R.R. Co.
vs. Schoenfeldt, 213 P. 26. Note: In the above, Justice Tolman expounded upon
the key of raisingrevenue by taxing the "privilege" to use the public roads "at
theexpense of those operating for gain." In this case, the word "traffic" is
used in conjunction with theunnecessary Auto Transportation Service, or in other
words, "vehiclesfor hire." The word "traffic" is another word which is to be
strictlyconstrued to the conducting of business. "Traffic -- Commerce,
trade, sale or exchange of merchandise,bills, money, or the like. The passing of
goods and commodities fromone person to another for an equivalent in goods or
money..." Bovier'sLaw Dictionary, 1914 ed., p. 3307. Here again, notice that
this definition refers to one "conductingbusiness." No mention is made of one
who is traveling in his automobile.This definition is of one who is engaged in
the passing of a commodityor goods in exchange for money, i.e.., vehicles for
hire. Furthermore, the word "traffic" and "travel" must have differentmeanings
which the courts recognize. The difference is recognized in ExParte Dickey,
supra: "...in addition to this, cabs, hackney coaches, omnibuses,taxicabs,
and hacks, when unnecessarily numerous, interfere with theordinary traffic and
travel and obstruct them." The court, by using both terms, signified its
recognition of adistinction between the two. But, what was the distinction? We
havealready defined both terms, but to clear up any doubt: "The word
`traffic' is manifestly used here in secondary sense, andhas reference to the
business of transportation rather than to itsprimary meaning of interchange of
commodities." Allen vs. City ofBellingham, 163 P. 18. Here the Supreme Court of
the State of Washington has defined the word"traffic" (in either its primary or
secondary sense) in reference tobusiness, and not to mere travel! So it is clear
that the term "traffic"is business related and therefore, it is a "privilege."
The net resultbeing that "traffic" is brought under the (police) power of
thelegislature. The term has no application to one who is not using theroads as
a place of business. LICENSE Florida § Chapter 322.01 Definitions (16)
"Driver's license" means acertificate which, subject to all other requirements
of law, authorizesan individual to drive a motor vehicle. It is clear that
Florida's definitions and meaning for the above is forcommerce not travel.It
seems only proper to define the word "license," as the definition ofthis word
will be extremely important in understanding the statutes asthey are properly
applied: "The permission, by competent authority to do an act which
withoutpermission, would be illegal, a trespass, or a tort." People
vs.Henderson, 218 NW.2d 2, 4. "Leave to do a thing which licensor could
prevent." WesternElectric Co. vs. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118. In
order for these two definitions to apply in this case, the statewould have to
take up the position that the exercise of a ConstitutionalRight to use the
public roads in the ordinary course of life andbusiness is illegal, a trespass,
or a tort, which the state could thenregulate or prevent. This position,
however, would raise magnitudinous Constitutionalquestions as this position
would be diametrically opposed to fundamentalConstitutional Law. (See
"Conversion of a Right to a Crime," infra.) In the instant case, the proper
definition of a "license" is: "a permit, granted by an appropriate
governmental body, generallyfor consideration, to a person, firm, or
corporation, to pursue someoccupation or to carry on some business which is
subject to regulationunder the police power." [emphasis added] Rosenblatt vs.
CaliforniaState Board of Pharmacy, 158 P.2d 199, 203. This definition would fall
more in line with the "privilege" of carryingon business on the streets. Most
people tend to think that "licensing" is imposed by the state forthe purpose of
raising revenue, yet there may well be more subtlereasons contemplated; for when
one seeks permission from someone to dosomething he invokes the jurisdiction of
the "licensor" which, in thiscase, is the state. In essence, the licensee may
well be seeking to beregulated by the "licensor." "A license fee is a
charge made primarily for regulation, with thefee to cover costs and expenses of
supervision or regulation." Statevs. Jackson, 60 Wisc.2d 700; 211 NW.2d 480,
487. The fee is the price; the regulation or control of the licensee is thereal
aim of the legislation. Are these licenses really used to fund legitimate
government, or arethey nothing more than a subtle introduction of police power
into everyfacet of our lives? Have our "enforcement agencies" been diverted
fromcrime prevention, perhaps through no fault of their own, instead nowbusying
themselves as they "check" our papers to see that all areproperly endorsed by
the state? How much longer will it be before we are forced to get a license for
ourlawn mowers, or before our wives will need a license for her "blender"or
"mixer?" They all have motors on them and the state can always usethe revenue.
POLICE POWER The confusion of the police power with the power of taxation
usuallyarises in cases where the police power has affixed a penalty to acertain
act, or where it requires licenses to be obtained and a certainsum be paid for
certain occupations. The power used in the instant casecannot, however, be the
power of taxation since an attempt to levy a taxupon a Right would be open to
Constitutional objection. (See "taxingpower," infra.) Each law relating to the
use of police power must ask three questions: "1. Is there threatened
danger? 2. Does a regulation involve aConstitutional Right? 3. Is this
regulation reasonable?" People vs.Smith, 108 Am.St.Rep. 715; Bovier's Law
Dictionary, 1914 ed., under"Police Power." When applying these three questions
to the statute in question, somevery important issues emerge. First, "is there a
threatened danger" in the individual using his Privateautomobile on the public
highways, in the ordinary course of life andbusiness? The answer is No! There is
nothing inherently dangerous in the use of anautomobile when it is carefully
managed. Their guidance, speed, andnoise are subject to a quick and easy
control, under a competent andconsiderate manager, it is as harmless on the road
as a horse and buggy. It is the manner of managing the automobile, and that
alone, whichthreatens the safety of the public. The ability to stop quickly and
torespond quickly to guidance would seem to make the automobile one of theleast
dangerous conveyances. (See Yale Law Journal, December, 1905.) "The
automobile is not inherently dangerous." Cohens vs. Meadow, 89SE 876; Blair vs.
Broadmore, 93 SE 532. To deprive all persons of the Right to use the road in the
ordinarycourse of life and business, because one might, in the future,
becomedangerous, would be a deprivation not only of the Right to travel, butalso
the Right to due process. (See "Due Process," infra.) Next, does the regulation
involve a Constitutional Right? This question has already been addressed and
answered in this brief, andneed not be reinforced other than to remind this
Court that this Citizendoes have the Right to travel upon the public highway by
automobile inthe ordinary course of life and business. It can therefore be
concludedthat this regulation does involve a Constitutional Right. The third
question is the most important in this case. "Is thisregulation reasonable?" The
answer is No! It will be shown later in "Regulation," infra., thatthis licensing
statute is oppressive and could be effectivelyadministered by less oppressive
means. Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not interfere with the
properexercise of the police power, in accordance with the general principlethat
the power must be exercised so as not to invade unreasonably therights
guaranteed by the United States Constitution, it is establishedbeyond question
that every state power, including the police power, islimited by the Fourteenth
Amendment (and others) and by the inhibitionsthere imposed. Moreover, the
ultimate test of the propriety of police power regulationsmust be found in the
Fourteenth Amendment, since it operates to limitthe field of the police power to
the extent of preventing theenforcement of statutes in denial of Rights that the
Amendment protects.(See Parks vs. State, 64 NE 682.) "With regard
particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it iselementary that a Right secured or
protected by that document cannot beoverthrown or impaired by any state police
authority." Connolly vs.Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 US 540; Lafarier vs. Grand
Trunk R.R. Co., 24A. 848; O'Neil vs. Providence Amusement Co., 108 A. 887.
"The police power of the state must be exercised in subordinationto the
provisions of the U.S. Constitution." [emphasis added]Panhandle Eastern
Pipeline Co. vs. State Highway Commission, 294 US 613;Bacahanan vs. Wanley, 245
US 60. "It is well settled that the Constitutional Rights protected
frominvasion by the police power, include Rights safeguarded both byexpress and
implied prohibitions in the Constitutions." Tiche vs.Osborne, 131 A. 60.
"As a rule, fundamental limitations of regulations under the policepower are
found in the spirit of the Constitutions, not in the letter,although they are
just as efficient as if expressed in the clearestlanguage." Mehlos vs.
Milwaukee, 146 NW 882. As it applies in the instant case, the language of the
Fifth Amendmentis clear: No person shall be...deprived of Life, Liberty, or
Property withoutdue process of law. As has been shown, the courts at all levels
have firmly established anabsolute Right to travel. In the instant case, the
state, by applying commercial statutes to allentities, natural and artificial
persons alike, has deprived this freeand natural person of the Right of Liberty,
without cause and withoutdue process of law. DUE PROCESS "The essential
elements of due process of law are...Notice and TheOpportunity to defend." Simon
vs. Craft, 182 US 427. Yet, not one individual has been given notice of the loss
of his/herRight, let alone before signing the license (contract). Nor was
theCitizen given any opportunity to defend against the loss of his/herright to
travel, by automobile, on the highways, in the ordinary courseof life and
business. This amounts to an arbitrary deprivation ofLiberty. "There should
be no arbitrary deprivation of Life or Liberty..."Barbour vs. Connolly, 113 US
27, 31; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 US 356....and... "The right to travel is
part of the Liberty of which acitizen cannot deprived without due process of law
under the FifthAmendment. This Right was emerging as early as the Magna Carta."
Kentvs. Dulles, 357 US 116 (1958). The focal point of this question of police
power and due process mustbalance upon the point of making the public highways a
safe place forthe public to travel. If a man travels in a manner that creates
actualdamage, an action would lie (civilly) for recovery of damages. The
statecould then also proceed against the individual to deprive him of hisRight
to use the public highways, for cause. This process would fulfillthe due process
requirements of the Fifth Amendment while at the sametime insuring that Rights
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and thestate constitutions would be
protected. But unless or until harm or damage (a crime) is committed, there is
nocause for interference in the private affairs or actions of a Citizen. One of
the most famous and perhaps the most quoted definitions of dueprocess of law, is
that of Daniel Webster in his Dartmouth College Case(4 Wheat 518), in which he
declared that by due process is meant "a lawwhich hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry, and rendersjudgment only after trial." (See also
State vs. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020;Dennis vs. Moses, 52 P. 333.) Somewhat similar
is the statement that is a rule as old as the law that"no one shall be
personally bound (restricted) until he has had his dayin court," by which is
meant, until he has been duly cited to appear andhas been afforded an
opportunity to be heard. Judgment without suchcitation and opportunity lacks all
the attributes of a judicialdetermination; it is judicial usurpation and it is
oppressive and cannever be upheld where it is fairly administered. (12 Am.Jur.
[1st]Const. Law, Sect.573, p.269.) Note: This sounds like the process used to
deprive one of the"privilege" of operating a motor vehicle "for hire." It should
be keptin mind, however, that we are discussing the arbitrary deprivation ofthe
Right to use the road that all citizens have "in common." The futility of the
state's position can be most easily observed in the1959 Washington Attorney
General's opinion on a similar issue: "The distinction between the Right of
the Citizen to use the publichighways for private, rather than commercial
purposes is recognized..."...and... "Under its power to regulate private uses of
our highways, ourlegislature has required that motor vehicle operators be
licensed (I.C.49-307). Undoubtedly, the primary purpose of this requirement is
toinsure, as far as possible, that all motor vehicle operators will becompetent
and qualified, thereby reducing the potential hazard or riskof harm, to which
other users of the highways might otherwise besubject. But once having complied
with this regulatory provision, byobtaining the required license, a motorist
enjoys the privilege oftraveling freely upon the highways..." Washington A.G.O.
59-60 No. 88,p. 11. This alarming opinion appears to be saying that every person
using anautomobile as a matter of Right, must give up the Right and convert
theRight into a privilege. This is accomplished under the guise ofregulation.
This statement is indicative of the insensitivity, even theignorance, of the
government to the limits placed upon governments byand through the several
constitutions. This legal theory may have been able to stand in 1959; however,
as of1966, in the United States Supreme Court decision in Miranda, even thisweak
defense of the state's actions must fall. "Where rights secured by the
Constitution are involved, there canbe no rule making or legislation which would
abrogate them." Miranda vs.Arizona, 384 US 436, 491. Thus the legislature does
not have the power to abrogate the Citizen'sRight to travel upon the public
roads, by passing legislation forcingthe citizen to waive his Right and convert
that Right into a privilege.Furthermore, we have previously established that
this "privilege" hasbeen defined as applying only to those who are "conducting
business inthe streets" or "operating for-hire vehicles." The legislature has
attempted, by legislative fiat, to deprive theCitizen of his Right to use the
roads in the ordinary course of life andbusiness, without affording the Citizen
the safeguard of "due process oflaw." This has been accomplished under supposed
powers of regulation. REGULATION "In addition to the requirement that
regulations governing the useof the highways must not be vocative of
constitutional guarantees, theprime essentials of such regulation are
reasonableness, impartiality,and definiteness or certainty." 25 Am.Jur. (1st)
Highways, Sect.260....and... "Moreover, a distinction must be observed between
theregulation of an activity which may be engaged in as a matter of rightand
one carried on by government sufferance of permission." Davis vs.Massachusetts,
167 US 43; Pachard vs Banton, supra. One can say for certain that these
regulations are impartial since theyare being applied to all, even though they
are clearly beyond the limitsof the legislative powers. However, we must
consider whether suchregulations are reasonable and vocative-vocative of
constitutionalguarantees. First, let us consider the reasonableness of this
statute requiring allpersons to be licensed (presuming that we are applying this
statute toall persons using the public roads). In determining the
reasonablenessof the statute we need only ask two questions: 1. Does the statute
accomplish its stated goal? The answer is No! The attempted explanation for
this regulation "to insure the safety ofthe public by insuring, as much as
possible, that all are competent andqualified." However, one can keep his
license without retesting, from the timehe/she is first licensed until the day
he/she dies, without regard tothe competency of the person, by merely renewing
said license before itexpires. It is therefore possible to completely skirt the
goal of thisattempted regulation, thus proving that this regulation does
notaccomplish its goal. Furthermore, by testing and licensing, the state gives
the appearance ofunderwriting the competence of the licensees, and could
therefore beheld liable for failures, accidents, etc. caused by licensees. 2. Is
the statute reasonable? The answer is No! This statute cannot be determined
to be reasonable since it requires tothe Citizen to give up his or her natural
Right to travel unrestrictedin order to accept the privilege. The purported goal
of this statutecould be met by much less oppressive regulations, i.e.,
competency testsand certificates of competency before using an automobile upon
thepublic roads. (This is exactly the situation in the aviation sector.) But
isn't this what we have now? The answer is No! The real purpose of this license
is much moreinsidious. When one signs the license, he/she gives up
his/herConstitutional Right to travel in order to accept and exercise
aprivilege. After signing the license, a quasi-contract, the Citizen hasto give
the state his/her consent to be prosecuted for constructivecrimes and
quasi-criminal actions where there is no harm done and nodamaged property. These
prosecutions take place without affording the Citizen of theirConstitutional
Rights and guarantees such a the Right to a trial by juryof twelve persons and
the Right to counsel, as well as the normalsafeguards such as proof of intent
and a corpus delicti and a grand juryindictment. These unconstitutional
prosecutions take place because theCitizen is exercising a privilege and has
given his/her "impliedconsent" to legislative enactments designed to control
interstatecommerce, a regulated enterprise under the police power of the state.
We must now conclude that the Citizen is forced to give upConstitutional
guarantees of "Right" in order to exercise his state"privilege" to travel upon
the public highways in the ordinary course oflife and business. SURRENDER OF
RIGHTS A Citizen cannot be forced to give up his/her Rights in the name
ofregulation. "...the only limitations found restricting the right of the
stateto condition the use of the public highways as a means of
vehiculartransportation for compensation are (1) that the state must not exact
ofthose it permits to use the highways for hauling for gain that theysurrender
any of their inherent U.S. Constitutional Rights as acondition precedent to
obtaining permission for such use..." [emphasisadded] Riley vs. Laeson, 142 So.
619; Stephenson vs. Binford, supra. If one cannot be placed in a position of
being forced to surrenderRights in order to exercise a privilege, how much more
must this maximof law, then, apply when one is simply exercising (putting into
use) aRight? "To be that statute which would deprive a Citizen of the
rights ofperson or property, without a regular trial, according to the
courseand usage of the common law, would not be the law of the land." Hoke
vs.Henderson, 15 NC 15. ...and... "We find it intolerable that oneConstitutional
Right should have to be surrendered in order to assertanother." Simons vs.
United States, 390 US 389. Since the state requires that one give up Rights in
order to exercisethe privilege of driving, the regulation cannot stand under the
policepower, due process, or regulation, but must be exposed as a statutewhich
is oppressive and one which has been misapplied to deprive theCitizen of Rights
guaranteed by the United States Constitution and thestate constitutions. TAXING
POWER "Any claim that this statute is a taxing statute would beimmediately
open to severe Constitutional objections. If it could besaid that the state had
the power to tax a Right, this would enable thestate to destroy Rights
guaranteed by the constitution through the useof oppressive taxation. The
question herein, is one of the state taxingthe Right to travel by the ordinary
modes of the day, and whether thisis a legislative object of the state taxation.
The views advanced herein are neither novel nor unsupported byauthority. The
question of taxing power of the states has beenrepeatedly considered by the
Supreme Court. The Right of the state toimpede or embarrass the Constitutional
operation of the U.S. Governmentor the Rights which the Citizen holds under it,
has been uniformlydenied." McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316. The power to
tax is the power to destroy, and if the state is given thepower to destroy
Rights through taxation, the framers of theConstitution wrote that document in
vain. "...It may be said that a tax of one dollar for passing through
thestate cannot sensibly affect any function of government or deprive aCitizen
of any valuable Right. But if a state can tax...a passenger ofone dollar, it can
tax him a thousand dollars." Crandall vs. Nevada, 6Wall 35, 46. ...and... "If
the Right of passing through a state by aCitizen of the United States is one
guaranteed by the Constitution, itmust be sacred from state taxation." Ibid.,
p.47. Therefore, the Right of travel must be kept sacred from all forms ofstate
taxation and if this argument is used by the state as a defense ofthe
enforcement of this statute, then this argument also must fail. CONVERSION OF A
RIGHT TO A CRIME As previously demonstrated, the Citizen has the Right to travel
and totransport his property upon the public highways in the ordinary courseof
life and business. However, if one exercises this Right to travel(without first
giving up the Right and converting that Right into aprivilege) the Citizen is by
statute, guilty of a crime. This amounts toconverting the exercise of a
Constitutional Right into a crime. Recall the Miller vs. U.S. and Snerer vs.
Cullen quotes, and, ... "Thestate cannot diminish Rights of the people." Hurtado
vs. California, 110US 516. ...and... "Where rights secured by the Constitution
areinvolved, there can be no rule making or legislation which wouldabrogate
them." Miranda, supra. Indeed, the very purpose for creating the state under the
limitations ofthe constitution was to protect the rights of the people from
intrusion,particularly by the forces of government. So we can see that any
attempt by the legislature to make the act ofusing the public highways as a
matter of Right into a crime, is voidupon its face. Any person who claims his
Right to travel upon the highways, and soexercises that Right, cannot be tried
for a crime of doing so. And yet,this Freeman stands before this court today to
answer charges for the"crime" of exercising his Right to Liberty. As we have
already shown, the term "drive" can only apply to those whoare employed in the
business of transportation for hire. It has beenshown that freedom includes the
Citnzen's Right to use the publichighways in the ordinary course of life and
business without license orregulation by the police powers of the state.
CONCLUSION It is the duty of the court to recognize the substance of things and
notthe mere form. "The courts are not bound by mere form, nor are they to
be misledby mere pretenses. They are at liberty -- indeed they are under
asolemn duty -- to look at the substance of things, whenever they enterupon the
inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits ofits authority. If,
therefore, a statute purported to have been enactedto protect...the public
safety, has no real or substantial relation tothose objects or is a palpable
invasion of Rights secured by thefundamental law, it is the duty of the courts
to so adjudge, and therebygive effect to the Constitution." Mulger vs. Kansas,
123 US 623, 661....and... "It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for
theConstitutional rights of the citizen and against any stealthyencroachments
thereon." Boyd vs. United States, 116 US 616. The courts are "duty bound" to
recognize and stop the "stealthyencroachments" which have been made upon the
Citizen's Right to traveland to use the roads to transport his property in the
"ordinary courseof life and business." (Hadfield, supra.) Further, the court
must recognize that the Right to travel is part ofthe Liberty of which a Citizen
cannot be deprived without specific causeand without the "due process of law"
guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment.(Kent, supra.) The history of this "invasion"
of the Citizen's Right to use the publichighways shows clearly that the
legislature simply found a heretoforeuntapped source of revenue, got greedy, and
attempted to enforce astatute in an unconstitutional manner upon those free and
naturalindividuals who have a Right to travel upon the highways. This was
notattempted in an outright action, but in a slow, meticulous,
calculatedencroachment upon the Citizen's Right to travel. This position must be
accepted unless the prosecutor can show hisauthority for the position that the
"use of the road in the ordinarycourse of life and business" is a privilege. To
rule in any other manner, without clear authority for an adverseruling, will
infringe upon fundamental and basic concepts ofConstitutional law. This
position, that a Right cannot be regulatedunder any guise, must be accepted
without concern for the monetary lossof the state. "Disobedience or evasion
of a Constitutional Mandate cannot betolerated, even though such disobedience
may, at least temporarily,promote in some respects the best interests of the
public." Slote vs.Examination, 112 ALR 660. ...and... "Economic necessity cannot
justify adisregard of Constitutional guarantee." Riley vs. Carter, 79 ALR
1018;16 Am.Jur. (2nd), Const. Law, Sect.81. ...and... "Constitutional
Rightscannot be denied simply because of hostility to their assertions
andexercise; vindication of conceded Constitutional Rights cannot be
madedependent upon any theory that it is less expensive to deny them than
toafford them." Watson vs. Memphis, 375 US 526. Wherefore, the Court's decision
in the instant case must be made withoutthe issue of cost to the state being
taken into consideration, as thatissue is irrelevant. The state cannot lose
money that it never had aright to demand from the "Sovereign People." Finally,
we come to the issue of "public policy." It could be arguedthat the "licensing
scheme" of all persons is a matter of "publicpolicy." However, if this argument
is used, it too must fail, as: "No public policy of a state can be allowed
to override thepositive guarantees of the U.S. Constitution." 16 Am.Jur. (2nd),
Const.Law, Sect.70. So even "public policy" cannot abrogate this Citizen's Right
to traveland to use the public highways in the ordinary course of life
andbusiness. Therefore, it must be concluded that: "We have repeatedly held
that the legislature may regulate the useof the highways for carrying on
business for private gain and that suchRegulation is a valid exercise of the
police power." Northern PacificR.R. Co., supra. ...and... "The act in question
is a valid regulation,and as such is binding upon all who use the highway for
the purpose ofprivate gain." Ibid. Any other construction of this statute would
render it unconstitutionalas applied to this Citizen or any Citizen. Your
Defendant was not anddoes not traffic anything nor was he involved in traffic as
definedabove or in any legal or other dictionary. There was no crime committedby
your Defendant Now NO STATE may convert a RIGHT into a PRIVILEGE and require a
LICENSE or FEE for the exercise of that RIGHT!!! Please see MURDOCK vs.
PENNSYLVANIA, 319 U.S. 105, and if a STATE does erroneously do require A LICENSE
OR FEE for exercise of the RIGHT, the Citizen may IGNORE THE LICENSE AND OR FEE
and exercise the RIGHT WITH TOTAL IMPUNITY!!! Please see SCHUTTLESWORTH vs.
BIRMINGHAM 373 U.S. 262. YOU CAN NOT BE PUNISHED FOR THE EXERCISE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT!!! Please see MILLER vs. UNITED STATES 230 F2nd 486.
since the Constitution is the Supreme Law of the
Land, it must reign supreme, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)

THEREFORE being your Appellant has committed no crime, for there are noinjured
parties or complaining parties with common law and/or statutestanding, causing
this court to lack jurisdiction as shown above, thissovereign, WILLIAM JON
WISEMAN, (as denoted by his Affidavit of CommonLaw Citizenship) moves this case
be dismissed in favor of your Appellant. If not dismissed, a stay is requested
while this Brief isappealed to the higher courts.

CERTIFICATE OF
SERVICE
I Certify That on 28 day of July, 2003 I served
a true copy of this Notice of Appeal On:
Rick WhitLock
City Attorney
500 Klamath Avenue
Klamath Falls or 97601
By hand delivery

August 4, 2003 ________________________________WILLIAM JON WISEMAN Signed
without PrejudiceBy A Good and Lawful Christian1625 SISKIYOU ST UNIT AKLAMATH
FALLS, OR 97601

STATE OF OREGON
COUNTY OF KLAMATH

BE IT REMEMBERED That on this .....day
of.........2003
Before me, the undersigned, a notary public in
and for the state of Oregon, Personally appeared the within
named..................known to me to be the identical individual..described in
and who executed the within instrument and acknowledged to me that ....executed
the same freely and voluntarily
.
IN
TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
My
official seal the day and year last above written.

........................
My
Commission expires...............

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LUKE 11:52 "Woe unto you, lawyers!"
LET THE CONSTITUTION SPEAK
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